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I. INTRODUCTION
The hearing before the family court judge was the kind of
routine hearing that occurs in family, juvenile, or dependency
courts numerous times every day across the county. The
"six-month review" examined the case of a young mother and
father who had allegedly battered and injured their three-
month-old baby. Neither parent had admitted the attack, yet
neither could offer an explanation for the injury. The child
had been removed from the parents and placed with a foster
family. Eighteen months had passed, and this was the third
"six-month review." Attending the hearing were the parents,
an attorney representing each parent, a representative from
the county child welfare agency, an attorney from the county
child welfare agency, an attorney representing the child, and
various witnesses, including the child welfare worker as-
signed to the case and the worker's supervisor.
The issue at the hearing was whether the child should be
returned to his parents. While neither parent offered the
most modest or credible explanation for the injury, both had
complied with the department's case plan. They had at-
tended parenting classes and had consistently attended ther-
apy sessions. On the basis of the parents' compliance, the
county child welfare agency was recommending the child be
returned home. The child's attorney argued that the parents
had merely complied with the case plan. There was no evi-
dence, the child's attorney argued, that the parents had
changed or that the risk of future injury had been, in any
way, diminished.
In theory, this kind of typical case review hearing took
place on a level playing field. Each party had legal represen-
tation and the judge could weigh the evidence and rights of
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the parties as she balanced the parents' rights of liberty and
undue governmental interference against the child's right to
protection.
This paper argues that the ideal of a level playing field that
provides both parties with legal advocacy and allows for an
unbiased assessment of the weight of evidence is an illusion.
The child welfare "playing field" is in reality decidedly unbal-
anced, almost always tilted in favor of the parents' rights at
the expense of a child's protection. The prevailing ideology of
the family court, child welfare system, and society has cre-
ated and nurtured a series of illusions and myths that favor
parents' rights. The actual procedures in most family or ju-
venile courts also weigh more in favor of the parents' rights
than of a child's right to protection.
Recent legislative responses have not corrected this Imbal-
ance. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 ("ASFA"),'
for example, was designed to be a step towards creating a
more level playing field. This legislation, however, does not go
far enough to create true balance and, even in its present
form, the legislation has been attacked as an unfair and dis-
criminatory intrusion into the rights of parents, especially
minority parents.2
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE LAW
A. Historical Background and Basic Procedures
American law and tradition grant to parents broad discre-
tion in how they may rear their children.3 In Smith v. Organi-
zation of Foster Families for Equality & Reform,4 the Supreme
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment gave biological
parents a "constitutionally recognized liberty interest" in
maintaining the custody of their children "that derives from
blood relationship, state law sanction, and basic human
right. " This interest is not absolute, however, because par-
Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42
u.s.c.).
2 See Martin Guggenheim, Commentary, The Foster Care Dilemma and What to Do
About It: Is the Problem that Too Many Children are Not Being Adopted Out of Foster
Care or that Too Many Children are Entering Foster Care?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 106.
108-10 (1999); Dorothy Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's Rights?, 2 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 84, 85-86, 94 (1999).
3 See generally JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (O.W. Holmes, Jr.
ed., 1873).
4 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
5 Id. at 846.
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ens patriae duties give the state power and authority to pro-
tect citizens who cannot fend for themselves.'
The state may attempt to limit or end parent-child contact
and make children eligible for temporary or permanent
placement or adoption when the parents: (1) abuse, neglect,
or abandon their children, (2) become incapacitated in their
ability to be a parent, (3) refuse or are unable to remedy seri-
ous, identified problems in caring for their children, or (4) ex-
perience an extraordinarily severe breakdown in their rela-
tionship with their children (for example, breakdowns caused
by a long prison sentence).7 Cognizant that severing the par-
ent-child relationship is an extremely drastic measure, the
Court held in Santosky v. Kramer that parental rights may
only be terminated if the state can demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that a parent has failed in one of these
four ways.' Most state statutes also contain provisions for
parents to voluntarily relinquish their rights.'0 The state also
has the authority to return a child to his or her parents."
Ideally, a reunification occurs once a determination is made
that it would be safe to return the child home and the child's
parents would be able to provide appropriate care.
The family or juvenile court is involved in each step in this
process. Child welfare agencies are responsible for investi-
gating and managing cases of child maltreatment. However,
the court is responsible for making the final decisions about
whether children are removed from or returned to their par-
ents, where children are to be placed,"2 or whether to termi-
nate parental rights and adoptions.
The ideal role of the juvenile, family, or dependency court
in child welfare matters is to balance parents' constitutional
rights to be free from undue and unwarranted interference in
raising their children with the dependent child's right to pro-
tection from harm. Child protection is bolstered by the
state's ability to seek ex parte orders or stipulations that al-
low a child to be removed from what is deemed an unsafe
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (explaining that 'a parens
patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child' Is at stake in
parental rights termination proceedings).
7 See id. at 766.
8 Id. at 745.
9 Id. at 768-70.
10 See, e.g.. H. A. Davidson. The Courts and Child Maltreatment. in THE aATrERD
CHILD 482-99 (M.E. Helfer et al. eds.. 1997).
" Id.
12 Placement with relatives, foster care and residential treatment are often among
the options available.
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caretaking environment. State laws also allow hospitals to
place "holds" of various lengths on children in order to pro-
tect the children and allow for an investigation into the chil-
dren's care situations.
1 3
Ex parte orders and "holds" are short-term efforts designed
to protect children. Generally, if upon conducting a medical
evaluation or child protective evaluation the state'concludes
that a child is at risk and should be removed from the care
giving environment, the matter is placed before a juvenile or
family court judge or master for a hearing. The hearing pro-
ceeds in a typical adversary style.
Before examining a child's rights and representation in a
child welfare legal action, it is important to look at the insti-
tutional and cultural context of the child welfare system. For
at least the last 100 years, private and public social welfare
institutions and agencies- not the criminal justice system-
have responded to the abuse and neglect of children. The
case of Mary Ellen Wilson, a neglected child discovered in
New York City in 1874, is perhaps the most well-known ex-
ample.1 4 Mary Ellen had been beaten with a leather thong
and allowed to go ill-clothed in cold weather.' 5 Mary Ellen's
case was initially investigated by Etta Wheeler, a "friendly
visitor" who worked for St. Luke's Methodist Mission. The
New York police declined to become involved, as there was no
evidence that a crime had been committed."
In the years after the Mary Ellen case, child abuse and ne-
glect have emerged as social problems in need of a social
welfare response.' Unless a homicide took place, and even
when a child was killed, the institution responsible for inves-
tigating cases, responding, and protecting was a social wel-
fare institution.'8 Despite the fact that some acts of child
abuse are clearly acts of felony assault and violate criminal
codes, the criminal justice system, from the police, to prose-
1a See Davidson, supra note 10.
14 See, e.g., B. NELSON, MAKING AN ISSUE OF CHILD ABUSE: POLITICAL AGENDA
SETTING FOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS (1984).
15 See generally RICHARD GELLES, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES 28-29 (3d ed.
1997); RICHARD GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: How PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST
CHILDREN'S LIVES 10-13 (1996) [hereinafter GELLES (1996)].
16 Legend has it that Mary Ellen's case was argued in court by the Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals because Mary Ellen was a member of the "animal
kingdom." In fact, the case was accepted by the court because the child needed
protection. The ASPCA did not represent Mary Ellen, but private societies for the
prevention of cruelty to children were established after the case received broad cov-
erage in the New York City newspapers. See NELSON, supra note 14, at 7-8.1 See generally D. LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN (1994).
18 Id.
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cutors, to criminal courts, are rarely directly involved in such
cases (with cases of child homicide and child sexual abuse as
exceptions to this pattern).' 9
Because social welfare institutions have authority over
child welfare cases, the legal cases do not result in a true ad-
versary proceeding pitting the state against the offenders, as
would result, for example, in a case of domestic violence.
Rather, the legal proceedings involve a state's, county's, or
municipality's department of child welfare versus the parents
or caretakers of the alleged victim.20
The cultural context that led to the creation of this system
and its continued support revolves around the constitutional
imperative that parents should be free from undue interfer-
ence in raising their children.1 In addition, deep cultural
convictions, values, and ideologies support child maltreat-
ment as a child welfare, and not a criminal justice, issue.2
B. The llusion of the "Level Playing Field"
While the judicial system has been structured as a level
playing field, the cultural and ideological structure and con-
text of the child welfare system results in an uneven playing
field. There are seven key beliefs, values, and assumptions
that constitute the culture of the child welfare system. While
each belief has some basis in experience, on the whole, these
beliefs and assumptions lack empirical support. The follow-
ing are the seven key beliefs of the child welfare system,
which, we believe are actually illusions:
1. Parents want to and can change their abusive and ne-
glectSfu behavior. - At the core of child welfare work is the
belief that most, if not all, parents want to be good and caring
parents and caretakers.2 Whether maltreating behavior is
thought to arise from psychological causes, alcohol or sub-
stance abuse, or social or structural stresses, the child wel-
fare system is structured under the assumption that parents
want to change their behaviors. As a result, the assumption
that parents both want to receive and can make use of the
offered resources (such as therapy, parenting classes, home-
maker services, and advocacy) underlies the "hard" and "soft"
19 Id.
20 See Davidson, supra note 10.
21 Id. at 487; see also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Re-
form, 431 U.S. 816. 816 (1977).
22 See LINDSEY, supra note 17.
23 See fri.
Dec. 1999]
JOURNAL OF CONSTTUTIONAL LAW
services' offered by the child welfare system.
2. Changes can be achieved if there are sufficient re-
sources. - The second belief follows directly from the first.
If parents and caretakers want to change, then the only con-
straint or roadblock to change is the lack of resources. If
change does not occur, it is attributed to a lack of soft or
hard resources, not to the parents' lack of willingness or abil-
ity to change. Federal, state, and local policy for child welfare
has been to seek increases in staff and funding so as to in-
crease the services that can be provided to maltreating care-
takers.
3. A safe and lasting family reunification can be achieved if
there are sufficient resources. - Although judicial precedent
and procedure attempt to balance parents' rights and child
safety, in reality the child welfare system places its greatest
emphasis on keeping families together.' As the Adoption As-
sistance and Child Welfare Act of 198026 ("Adoption Act")
states, in order to be eligible for federal Title IV-E funding,27
state departments of child welfare must make "reasonable
efforts" to keep children in their homes or return them safely
to their biological caretakers.' As a result, for the past 17
years, case plans for children in the child welfare system al-
most always began with the singular goal of reunification.
Given the first two beliefs, the child welfare system assumes
that if the system has sufficient personnel and service re-
sources, children could be safely kept at home or returned
home to their parents.
4. Children do better when raised by their biological par-
ents. - The core ideological value of the child welfare sys-
tem and society at large is that children do best when raised
by their biological parents.29 Clearly, for the majority of chil-
dren, this belief is accurate and the value appropriate. How-
ever, when applied to children who have already been mal-
treated, the belief is more difficult to support with empirical
evidence.30 Nevertheless, the child welfare system operates as
if this statement applied equally to all children. One applica-
tion of this belief is the common child welfare ideology that
2Hard services" are defined as financial assistance, housing assistance, day care
and housekeeping. "Soft services" are defined as counseling, parenting classes, ad-
vocacy and case management.
See Davidson, supra note 10, at 487-88.
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679(a) (1988 & Supp. 1).
27 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 672-674, 675(4)(a) (1999).
See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988 & Supp. I).
See Davidson, supra note 10, at 487.
30 See GELLES (1996), supra note 15.
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even the best foster or adoptive family is not better for a child
than a marginal biological family." Thus, for more than 100
years the main focus of child welfare has been to rehabilitate
or assist biological parents so they can raise their children.
At the turn of the last century family preservation was the
province of the settlement house movement. Today, the
most recent attempts to keep maltreated children with their
biological caregivers are evidence of support for intensive
family preservation and family support programs.'
5. Following from the above four core beliefs, adoptions are
fragile, often fail and should be a last resorL - As Elizabeth
Bartholet points out, adoption as a permanent child place-
ment option is often dismissed or even demonized by the
child welfare system and by society at large!Z Thus, tradi-
tionally adoption has not been taken seriously as an option
for children whose parents are not capable of parenting. As
evidence of the reluctance to use adoption as an option, dur-
ing the 1990s, when child abuse reports increased and out-
of-home placements increased to nearly 600,000 children on
any given day,' adoptions actually decreased.' Child welfare
workers often point to anecdotal case evidence that adoptions
are difficult and often fail.'
6. Children and children's best interests are adequately
represented in child welfare judicial proceedings. - Cer-
tainly, as the opening paragraph of this paper suggests,'
children are represented in these proceedings. However, as
will be discussed below,9 the representation is variable.
Moreover, given the first five beliefs, it is easy to see how a
child's "best interests" are most often viewed through the
prism of the importance and value of keeping or reunifying
the child with his or her biological caretakers.
7. There are insufficient temporary and permanent place-
ments for at-risk maltreated children. - Even without the
first six beliefs, the child welfare system is skewed toward
family reunification because of the seventh illusion. Given
31 See i
32 See, e.g., L.B. COSTIN Er AL.. THE POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE IN AMERICA (1996).
See GELLES (1996), supra note 15.
See E. BARrHOLET, FAMLY BONDS (1993).
3 See T. TATARA, CHARACTERISTICS OF CHILDREN IN SUBSTITUTE AND ADoPTIVE CARE
(1993).
36 See C.S. BEVAN, FOSTER CARE: TOO MUCH. TOO LITTLE. Too EARLY. TOO LATE.
FINAL REPORT: CHILD PROTECTION: OLD PROBLEMS. NEV PARADIGM (1996).
3 See &L
38 See supra p. 1.
See infra pp. 111-12.
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that there are more than 1,500,000 substantiated reports of
child abuse and neglect each year,4" and that nearly 600,000
children are in out-of-home care on a given day,4' child wel-
fare workers and administrators find fewer families willing to
serve as foster families and adoptive families than are needed.
To a certain extent, this is not an illusion. There are too few
families available to either care for or adopt maltreated chil-
dren. However, the structure and function of the child wel-
fare system- driven by the above illusory beliefs- is respon-
sible for the insufficient number of foster or adoptive families
available to care for children.
C. The Reality: The Actual Playing Field
There is, at the very least, a theoretical tension between
parents' rights and child protection. Because the underlying
ideology of the child welfare system is that the best placement
for children is with their parents, permanency, while theoreti-
cally allowing for a number of alternative placements (such as
legal guardianship, adoption, congregate care), is typically
conceptualized as keeping a child with his or her biological
parents or achieving a reunification with them.42 Similarly,
although child welfare institutions promote the ideology of
making decisions that are in "the best interests of the child,"
almost always the best interests are assumed to be achieved
if the child is raised by his or her biological caregivers.43
An example of this ideological commitment can be seen in
the institutional interpretation of the "reasonable efforts"
clause of the Adoption Act.' The Act requires that states
make "reasonable efforts" prior to the placement of a child in
foster care or to make it possible for a child to return to his
home. The statute defined neither "reasonable" nor "efforts."
Nevertheless, child welfare workers, supervisors, administra-
tors, attorneys, and judges often interpret this law to mean
that the State has an obligation to make every possible effort
40 See U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L CrR. ON CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1996: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE NAT'L CTR. ON
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1998).
41 See TATARA, supra note 35.
42 See Davidson, supranote 10, at 487.
43 See BEVAN, supra note 36.
44 See Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500, 503 (1980) ("[I]n each case, reasonable
efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal of a child from his home, and (B) to make it possible
for the child to return to his home. . .
45 Id.
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to keep a child in the home or to return a child. 6 Some state
child welfare statutes do in fact require every possible effort."
As noted above, the Supreme Court ruled in Santosky v.
Kramer that states could terminate parents' rights only if
there is clear and convincing evidence that parents have (1)
abused, neglected, and/or abandoned their children: (2) are
incapacitated themselves; (3) refused or are unable to remedy
problems in caring for their children; or (4) experienced a se-
vere breakdown in their relationship with their children.'
Parents who make a "reasonable effort" to care for their chil-
dren would not have their parental rights terminated.
The mandate for child welfare agencies and family, juve-
nile, or dependency courts is to find a balance between par-
ents' constitutional rights and children's rights. There ap-
pears to be a level playing field in achieving this balance;
however, appearances are not only deceiving, they are false.
What evidence is there that the above seven beliefs are, in
fact, illusions? The following empirical evidence undermines
the above ideological beliefs:
1. The notion that all parents want to and can change is
countered by a substantial body of research that demonstrates
that people in general, including abusive and neglectful par-
ents, are difficult to change. - A major failing of child abuse
and neglect assessments is the crude way behavior change is
conceptualized and measured. Behavior change is thought to
be a one-step process; one simply changes from one form of be-
havior to another. For example, if one is an alcohol or sub-
stance abuser, then change involves stopping the use of alcohol
or drugs. If one stops, but then begins again, then the change
has not successfully occurred.
Change, however, is not a one-step process. All individuals
are not equally ready to change. Psychologists James Pro-
chaska and Carlo DiClemente have developed "The Transtheo-
retical Model of Behavior Change," 9 which integrates a number
46 See GELLES (1996). supra note 15.
47 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 614(c) (Consol. 1998) (requiring that the author-
ized agency petitioning for custody "has made diligent efforts to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship and specifying the efforts made or that such ef-
forts would be detrimental to the best interests of the child and specifying the rea-
sons therefor"); see also In re Mug, 302 N.Y.S.2d 418. 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969)
(finding that "petitioner had not demonstrated 'by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence! that it had 'made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental
relationship' as required by" the Act).
48 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768-70.
49 See J.O. PROCHASKA ET AL., CHANGING FOR GOOD (1994); J.O. PROCHASKA & C.C.
DICLEMENTE, THE TRANSTHEOREICAL APPROACH: CROSSING TRADmo.NAL BOUNDARIES OF
CHANGE (1984) [hereinafter PROCHASKA & DICLEMFENTE (1984)1 J.O. Prochaska & C.C.
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of theoretical constructs central to change, such as Janis and
Mann's theory of decisional balance"° and Bandura's theory of
self-efficacy.5' The Transtheoretical Model assumes that
changing behavior is a dynamic process and that one pro-
gresses through a number of stages in trying to modify behav-
ior.52 It also assumes that there are cognitive aspects to be-
havior change that can be measured.53  Further, the
Transtheoretical Model is a general model of change and is not
linked to any particular type of intervention; the Model is capa-
ble of measuring change in individuals over time, over many
different kinds of interventions." The Transtheoretical Model
was developed from a study of 18 kinds of psychotherapy from
diverse theoretical backgrounds.5  Prochaska and DiClemente
surmised that what the different therapies had in common was
a number of "processes of change," such as consciousness
raising, stimulus control, and corrective emotional experience,
which transcended the particular theoretical perspective.'
They also articulated different stages of the change process and
developed an instrument to measure them.57 While much of
the development of the model took place in research on smok-
ing cessation, the compelling nature of the model and its
adaptability with other behavior change environments have led
to research in areas as diverse as diet, cocaine, weight control,
protected intercourse, sun and radon exposure, alcohol abuse,
mammography, adolescent smoking behavior, and delinquent
youth.s Briefly, empirical studies of the Transtheoretical Model
have found that individuals move through distinct stages of
change and that the majority of individuals are at what the re-
searchers call the "precontemplative" or "contemplative" stages
of change.5 " In lay terms, "precontemplators" or "contempla-
tors" tend to deny there is a problem, resist change, see more
DiClemente, Stages and Processes of Self-change in Smoking: Toward an Integrative
Model of Change. 5 J. OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 390-95 (1983); J.O. Pro-
chaska & C.C. DiClemente, Toward a More Integrative Model of Change, 19
PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RES. AND PRAC. 276-88 (1982).
50 I.L. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT,
CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT (1977).
51 A. Bandura, Self-efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavior Change, 84
PSYCHOL. REV. 191-215 (1977).
52 See PROCHASKA & DICLEMENTE (1984), supra note 49.
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See Prochaska & DiClemente, Toward a More Integrative Model of Change, su-
pra note 49.
57 See PROCHASKA & DICLEMENTE (1984), supra note 49.
s8 See PROCHASKA ET AL., supra note 49.
59 See PROCHASKA & DICLEMENTE (1984), supra note 49.
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negative aspects to change than positive ones, and are not
amenable to "action" interventions.
2. Although there is a general belief that change can be
achieved if there are sufficient soft and hard resources,' as yet.
there is no empirical evidence to support the effectiveness of
child welfare services in general, or in the newer, more innova-
tive, intensive family preservation services. - In 1994, the
National Academy of Sciences established the Committee on
the Assessment of Family Violence Interventions. One of the
five tasks charged to the Committee was to "[ciharacterize
what is known about both prevention efforts and specific in-
terventions dealing with family violence, including an as-
sessment of what has been learned about the strengths and
limitations of each approach."6 From 1980 to 1996, the
Committee's staff was able to identify a total of 114 evalua-
tion studies that met the Committee's four criteria for an
adequate evaluation study.6 Of the 114 studies, 78 evalu-
ated some aspect of the prevention and treatment of child
maltreatment. The programs evaluated mainly fell into one of
three categories: (1) "social service", (2) "legal interventions,"
and (3) "health care interventions. "c In the "social service"
category the programs evaluated included child-parent en-
richment programs, parent training, network support serv-
ices, home helpers, school-based sexual abuse prevention,
intensive family preservation services, child placement serv-
ices, and home health visitors.6 "Legal interventions" evalu-
ated included court-mandated treatment for child abuse of-
fenders, court mandated treatment emphasizing child
management skills, and in-patient treatment for sex offend-
ers.' Evaluations of "health care interventions" included an
identification protocol for high risk mothers, mental health
services for child victims, and home health visitor/family
60id
61 For a definition of "hard" and "soft" resources, see supra note 24.
62 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, VIOLENCE IN FAMIuES: ASSESSING PREVENTION AND
TRETMENT PROGRAMS 17 (1998).
63The search included published and unpublished studies, although the majority
of the 114 studies had been published. The four criteria were: (1) The evaluation
involved a program intervention that was designed to treat or prevent some aspect of
child maltreatment, domestic violence, or elder abuse; (2) the evaluation uas con-
ducted between 1980 and 1996; (3) the evaluation used an experimental design or
quasi-experimental design and included measurement tools and outcomes related to
family violence; and (4) the evaluation included a comparison group as part of the
study design. See idL at 21.
64 I L
66 d
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support programs. 67 The largest number of evaluations was
of school-based sexual abuse prevention programs and inten-
sive family preservation programs. The one commonality of
the 78 evaluations of child abuse and neglect prevention and
treatment programs was, in scientific terms, a failure to reject
the null hypothesis.' In other words, the experimental
treatment had no measurable effect. While it may be too
harsh a judgment to say these programs have not and do not
work as intended, the Committee's report did come to the
following conclusion regarding social service interventions:
"Social service interventions designed to improve parenting
practices and provide family support have not yet demon-
strated that they have the capacity to reduce or prevent abu-
sive or neglectful behaviors significantly over time for the
majority of families who have been reported for child mal-
treatment."69 With regard to intensive family preservation
services, there was also little evidence that such services re-
solve the underlying dysfunction that precipitated the crisis.
There was also no evidence that such services improve child
well-being or family functioning.
3. Although preserving families is certainly a worthy goal, it
is a difftcult one to accomplish. - For all the reasons noted
above (the individual and social problems confronting mal-
treating families, the limited quantity and quality of services
available, and the reluctance and difficulty individuals have
changing their behavior) reunifications are fragile and often
fail. Research indicates that approximately 50% of children
reunified with their families after a stay in foster care are put
back into out-of-home placement within 18 months.
4. Although adoption is considered a last resort by many in
the child welfare and child advocacy community," of all the
placement possibilities for children, adoption is the least likely
to fail. - In other words, the adoption alternative is least
likely to result in the child being moved after placement or
adoption. 2 Certainly, one reason why adoptions are more
67 Id.
68 Failure to reject the null hypothesis means that there was no statistically sig-
nificant difference between the experimental group and the control group in terms of
the outcome variable or variables.
69 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 118.
70 See R.P. BARTH ET AL., FROM CHILD ABUSE TO PERMANENCY PLANNING: CHILD
WELFARE SERVICES AND PLACEMENTS (1994).
71 See BARTHOLET, supra note 34.
See BARTH ET AL., supra note 70; Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Ne-
glected Childrew Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources
(Federal Document Clearing House Political Transcripts, Nov. 20, 1996) (testimony of
Peter Digre, Director, Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Serv-
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permanent and less likely to fail is the fact that adoptive
families tend to have more social and economic resources
than the average family or household."3 Whatever the cause,
if one wanted to predict which placement would be most
likely to be permanent for a child, it would be adoption.
5. Resources have been added to the child welfare system
for the past two decades without a measurable improvement.'
- A counter-argument to the above two realities (that re-
unifications fail and that adoptions are least likely to fail)
would be that adding resources to family preservation and
support programs would increase the odds of having reunifi-
cations succeed. However, beginning in 1993, the federal
government allocated $250 million per year for family preser-
vation and support programs.'m This amount was increased
in 1997.76 Adding resources, staff, more training, and other
resources to child welfare reform has not yet resulted in
measurable improvements, a reduction in child fatalities, or
increased child well-being." This lack of measurable change
lies in sharp contrast to other social problems, such as do-
mestic violence and violent crime, where there is concrete
evidence from multiple sources that the rates and numbers of
such behaviors have decreased in the last five years.8
6. What little research exists on out-of-home-placement has
found that children who reside in foster care fare neither better
nor worse than children who remain in homes in which mal-
treatment occurred.' - This undermines the belief that fos-
ter care placements are more dangerous and detrimental to
children than remaining with their biological parents who
have abused or neglected them.8
7. The current child welfare system is quite variable in how
it provides counsel and legal representation for children in-
volved in child welfare cases. - While parents in child wel-
ices, Los Angeles, CA).
73 See BARrHOLEr supra note 34.
74 See R.J. Gelles, How Evaluation Research Can Help Reform and Improve the
Child Welfare System (July 26. 1998) (unpublished paper presented at the Program
Evaluation and Family Violence Research: An International Conference. Durham.
NH).
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Pub. L. 103-66. 107 Stat. 312
(1993).
76 See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997. Pub. L. 105-89. 111 Stat. 2115
(1997).
77 See Gelles. supra note 74.
78 See Id.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62.
See supra notes 29, 30. 34, 40 and accompanying text: see aLso R. ELEnR.
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fare cases have legal representation (often, in fact, each par-
ent has legal representation) and while the child welfare
agency has counsel present, the children involved are often
not represented by legally trained and qualified attorneys.
According to Howard Davidson of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Children's Rights Project, in only half of the states In
the United States do children in dependency actions have
attorneys.8 In the other half of the states, children are repre-
sented either by Court Appointed Special Advocates ("CASA")
or Guardians Ad Litem. In only 30% to 40% of the states
does a child welfare statute define the role of the child's law-
yer; in the majority of the states the role is not defined.8
Some might argue that a CASA or Guardian Ad Litem is an
appropriate representative for a child's interests.' However,
if that were the case, why are parents afforded the right to
counsel in all dependency court actions? If a trained CASA or
guardian is sufficient for a child, why not for the parents as
well? The answer to this question is clear; parents are pro-
vided or obtain counsel to assure that their due process
rights are upheld.
Furthermore, even the trained and qualified counsel ap-
pointed to represent children may have only a limited grasp
and understanding of federal and state law and policy with
regard to child welfare. Many attorneys representing state or
county child welfare agencies believe that the federal mandate
of the Adoption Act is to make "every possible effort" to re-
unify families and that terminations of parental rights cannot
be sought or granted until all efforts at reunification have
been exhausted. The new Adoption and Safe Families Act is
even less well understood or applied. An attorney attending
the American Bar Association's Children's Rights Project
"Ninth Annual Conference on Children and the Law," In
Washington. D.C., stated during a question and answer ses-
sion that she had received training in Baltimore, Maryland,
from a regional administrator of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. She explained that her trainer
had stated that the new law required states to terminate pa-
rental rights in one-third of active child welfare cases. The
trainer went on to explain that the Federal government would
81 Interview with Howard Davidson, Director of the American Bar Association
Center on Children and the Law (Feb. 1999).
82 Id.
83Id.
8 See G. COURTER, I SPEAK FOR THIS CHILD: TRUE STORIES OF A CHILD ADVOCATE
(1995).
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withhold funds if this quota was not achieved. A second at-
torney stated that she had received training from a regional
administrator of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, who stated that the Federal Government would pay
states for meeting their termination quotas. Carol Williams,
then Associate Commissioner of the Administration on Chil-
dren, Youth and Families, stated that such statements about
quotas and financial incentives or penalties were incorrect.
D. The Legal Process
Taking a wider look at child welfare legal proceedings, we
also see the minimal legal protections and safeguards that
are provided children. It was not until 1974 that the federal
government even recommended (as part of a requirement for
federal child abuse and neglect funding) that states have a
Guardian Ad Litem represent the child's legal interests.' Avo
Supreme Court decisions also demonstrate the minimal pro-
tections provided children. In Suter v. Artist,8 the Supreme
Court ruled that the "reasonable efforts" clause of the Adop-
tion Actf neither created rights for children enforceable in an
action nor created an implied private right of action.3 In De-
Shaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,.
the Court ruled that if a state child welfare agency fails to
protect an individual against a caretaker's violence, that state
agency is not liable for the harm done to the child.') The fail-
ure of a state agency to protect an individual against private
violence, in other words, does not constitute a violation of due
process. This decision implies that state agencies cannot be
held liable for failing to protect a child from harm, even if they
are aware the child may be at risk.
In light of the absence of Supreme Court precedent that
federal law provide legal guarantees for children and that
children involved with the child welfare system have a right to
be protected, the legal rights of children have been advanced
by a series of class action suits against state and local child
See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974. Pub. L 93-247. 88
Stat. 4 (1974); 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14.(g).
503 U.S. 347 (1992).
42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679(a) (1988 & Supp. II.
as See Suter, 503 U.S. at 363 ('We conclude that 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) neither
confers an enforceable private right on its beneficiaries nor creates an implied cause
of action on their behalf.").
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
90 See id. at 196-97.
Dec. 19991
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
welfare agencies.9' At present, at least 27 states and many
more localities are under court order to improve child welfare
services.92  However, there is little consistency to be found
among the suits or court stipulations. In Alabama, for exam-
ple, the state is obliged to provide more family preservation
services;93 in Connecticut the state has been ordered to give
more weight to child safety.94 Unfortunately, however, even
class action suits have failed to provide a clear basis for the
rights and best interests of children (or even reflect differing
conceptions of children's "best interests").
For at least 100 years the main thrust of the child welfare
system has been to provide social and psychological re-
sources so that children can be raised without interference
from the government.95 While the child welfare system Is
criticized from all directions, one consistent concern is that
children are often removed from families without cause or
that families that can be helped are not afforded that oppor-
tunity.9' Those who demonstrate concern for children
harmed even after they have been identified by the child wel-
fare system are labeled "child savers," a pejorative term in
this context.
The child welfare system has been in crisis for nearly three
decades. The response to the crisis is a "round up the usual
suspects" call for more resources, more workers, and reor-
ganization of child welfare bureaucracies. 97 New federal leg-
islation, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,98 at-
tempts to create more balance in the system in three specific
ways: (1) by identifying instances where reunification efforts
do not have to be made for families,' (2) by requiring states to
seek termination of parental rights when children have been
in out of home care for 15 of the previous 22 months,'"° and
(3) mandating that states do concurrent planning, rather
than planning only for reunification and then seek alterna-
tives when such plans fail or are deemed inappropriate.'' In
Florida, Arkansas, and Michigan, plans are in place or are
91 See I. SC-VARTZ & G. FISHMAN, IDS RAISED BYTHE GOVERNMETr (1999).
92 See d.
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 See COSTIN ET AL., supra note 32.
See WEXLER, supra note 80; Guggenheim, supra note 2, at 109-10.
97 See ScHwARTz & FISHMAN, supra note 9 1.
98 Pub. L. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
See i. at§ 101(a), 111 Stat. at 2116.
00 Seeid. at§ 103(a), 111 Stat. at 2118.
01 See . at§ 101(a), 111 Stat. at 2116.
[Vol. 2:1I
THE CHILD VELFARE SYSTEM
being developed to transfer child protection investigations
from child welfare agencies to the sheriffs or police depart-
ments. There appears to be a subtle movement to treat child
maltreatment as a criminal justice problem, rather than as a
social welfare issue.
What impact ASFA and current changes regarding investi-
gations will have is still to be determined. What is clear,
however, is that currently children and their "best interests"
have only a minimal voice in child welfare proceedings. The
child welfare system remains a system where the client is the
parent, where the parent's legal rights are primary, and
where a child's developmental best interests are rarely repre-
sented or given careful and appropriate weight.
III. CONCLUSION
There is no controversy that there is a crisis with the child
welfare system today. Rather, the controversy arises when
proposals are advanced for the resolution of the crisis (and, to
a certain extent, during discussions of the actual nature of
the crisis). Most child welfare system observers agree that
the system both has not and is not protecting vulnerable and
abused children.1°2 Most observers would also agree that the
current system merely substitutes government neglect and
mistreatment for parental neglect and abuse. How this crisis
should be resolved is the dilemma.
It is difficult to defend providing more resources to a sys-
tem that has yet to demonstrate that it is working, or even
can work. Far too many children remain in harm's way and
far too many children lack permanence. There is, however,
no credible evidence that providing more resources for the
preservation of families will resolve this crisis. And there is
no evidence that the legal status quo can secure to children
their rights to safety and protection.
10 See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT. CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLET: CRITICAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY (1990).
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